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FOREWORD
CHARLES S. BOBIS*
The articles in this symposium issue of the St. John's Law
Review arise out of the conference that St. John's hosted on April
2 and 3, 1998, to mark the 30th anniversary of one of the United
States Supreme Court's most important and controversial constitutional criminal procedure decisions, Terry v. Ohio. In Terry,
the Court placed its constitutional imprimatur on the police investigative practice known as "stop and frisk," holding that the
Fourth Amendment permits an officer, without a warrant and
without probable cause to arrest, to stop and question a person
who the officer reasonably suspects is engaged in criminal behavior, and to frisk the person for a weapon if the officer reasonably
suspects the person may be armed and dangerous. The Court
did not apply the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause and its
probable cause requirement to this police practice. Instead, the
Court employed a reasonableness balancing test to determine
whether the officer's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment's
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Terry decision and its mode of analysis have had a profound and
lasting effect on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and policing
in the United States.
The Terry conference brought together leading legal scholars, jurists, practitioners, and experts on law enforcement from
throughout the United States. They explored Terry's impact on
Fourth Amendment law, its place in legal theory, its effect on
day-to-day policing, its impact on relations between minority
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
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populations and the police, and its relationship to the substantive criminal law. The St. John's Law Review is proud to provide
this outstanding group of thinkers from the bench, bar, academy,
and law enforcement the opportunity to illuminate one of the
most important decisions in modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by presenting the papers that grew out of the presentations at the seven conference panels. The authors have given
generously of their time and talent to produce what we believe
will become standard reference works in Fourth Amendment law
and constitutional criminal procedure generally.
The contributions to this issue begin with papers based on
what the conference organizers affectionately dubbed the
"memoir" panel, which brought together several of the principal
lawyers who litigated the Terry case and two of the Justices' law
clerks who worked on the stop and frisk decisions behind the
scenes. Congressman Louis Stokes, then an attorney in private
practice in Cleveland, Ohio, represented Mr. Terry all the way to
the Supreme Court, where he argued his case in December 1967.
Mr. Reuben Payne, who as an assistant prosecutor in Cleveland
was assigned to prosecute what seemed at the time a routine gun
possession case, successfully litigated the Terry case at every
stage of the proceedings. Judge Michael R. Juviler was, in 1967,
the Deputy Chief of the Appeals Bureau in the office of legendary
Manhattan District Attorney Frank Hogan.
Judge Juviler
briefed and argued, as amicus curiae, one of Terry's companion
cases, Sibron v. New York. The article by my colleague, Professor John Barrett, takes us behind the scenes and illuminates the
Court's process of deciding the stop and frisk cases in 1967-68.
Articles by Professor Earl Dudley, Jr. and Associate Attorney
General Raymond Fisher, who clerked for Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Brennan, respectively, during the crucial 1967 Term
of the Court, round out the "memoir" panel.
The second panel's papers examine Terry's effect on Fourth
Amendment law. Was Terry marvel or mischief? Is it a decision
that works for police and for citizens by striking an appropriate
balance between law enforcement needs and individual liberty,
or has it become a tool in the hands of lower courts for the continual expansion of police power over citizens through the use of
categorical rules that undercut the fact-sensitivity at the core of
the Terry doctrine? Articles by Professors Stephen Saltzburg
and David Harris take up this debate, with reaction pieces by

1998]

FOREWORD

Professors George Thomas III and Daniel Richman.
The third conference panel looked to the future of Fourth
Amendment law. Does Terry's balancing approach provide a
proportionality principle that should serve as the conceptual
framework for 21st Century search and seizure jurisprudence?
Are there two Terry's, each pointing Fourth Amendment law in a
different direction, one toward reasonableness as the touchstone
of search and seizure law, the other toward warrants and probable cause? If so, which Terry is consistent with Fourth
Amendment "first principles" and should be followed, and which
should be rejected? These and other important questions are
addressed in articles by Professors Christopher Slobogin and
Akhil Amar. Responses by Professors Scott Sundby and Eric
Muller enhance the debate about the proper direction of Fourth
Amendment law as we approach the new millennium.
The contributions from the fourth conference panel shift the
focus away from Terry itself to raise and debate significant
questions about the current state and future prospects of a general theory of the Fourth Amendment. Are attempts by scholars
to formulate a general theoretical solution to the problem of the
Fourth Amendment doomed to failure because Fourth Amendment law is a "grown" not "made" system (using Friedrich
Hayek's dichotomy), simply not amenable to the top-down analytical efforts in which many Fourth Amendment scholars are
engaged? Should their efforts instead be redirected toward developing what might be called "local knowledge" about Fourth
Amendment law? And how does the opposition between local
and general theoretical knowledge impact on the Terry problem
of regulating the behavior of the police in street stops? The article by Professor Ronald Allen and Mr. Ross Rosenberg begins the
discussion, with Professors Carol Steiker and William Stuntz
joining issue.
Shifting attention from the theoretical to the practical, the
fifth conference panel explored the "on the job" effects on police
of Terry's stop and frisk doctrine. The authority to stop, to
question and, where danger appears to exist, to frisk suspicious
persons vests broad discretion in the police that is easily abused.
Even if the stop and frisk practice that the Terry Court approved
is a necessary, even an indispensable, investigative tool that police had long employed-after all, from a police perspective, what
else was Detective McFadden to do when he saw John Terry and
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his companions apparently preparing for a "stickup?"-serious
questions remain about how to prevent police abuses. Should we
rely on internal administrative rulemaking by police departments and involvement of communities in developing anti-crime
strategies to regulate such "low visibility" police practices? Or,
given the vagaries of the reasonable suspicion standard, is judicial regulation of police discretion still our best hope for enforcing the limits of Terry? These themes are taken up and developed in the article by Professor James Fyfe, a veteran former
New York City police officer, and the responses by former New
York City Police Commissioner Robert McGuire and Professors
Margaret Raymond and Jerome Skolnick.
The sixth conference panel directly addressed an issue that
arose several times during the conference and which inevitably
must be confronted in any appraisal of stop and frisk doctrine:
Terry and race. Why did the Terry Court, while openly acknowledging that aggressive police patrol and field interrogation practices were often used to harass, humiliate, and control people of
color in America's inner cities, still choose to allow forcible police-citizen encounters on less than probable cause? Why did it
not follow the course it had chosen in Miranda just two years
earlier, in which it recognized the imbalance of power between
the often poor and minority criminal suspect and the police in
the context of custodial interrogation and intervened in an attempt to protect the Fifth Amendment values at stake there?
Was the Court simply wrong in Terry? Is Terry's Fourth
Amendment legacy the continued subordination of the liberty
and personal security interests of African-American men to the
discretion of the police? Or has the political landscape in America changed so much that the flexible balancing approach taken
in Terry makes it right for today? These are among the important questions explored and illuminated in articles by Professor
Tracey Maclin, Judge Jack Weinstein and Ms. Mae Quinn, and
Professor Tracey Meares.
The last group of papers presented in this symposium issue
is derived from the roundtable discussion on the relationship between Terry stop and frisk doctrine and the substantive criminal
law that concluded the Terry conference. That relationship is
complex and affects current policing strategies such as community policing and the revived use of loitering ordinances aimed at
drug or gang activity, including the anti-gang ordinance cur-
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rently before the Supreme Court in the Morales1 case. These
timely issues are explored by Professors Mary Coombs, Debra
Livingston, William Stuntz (who generously did double duty at
the conference), and Judge John Keenan.
Enjoy!

1

City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S.Ct.

1510 (1998). Oral arguments are scheduled for December 8, 1998.
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